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Abstract
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has affected many regions including Latin America.
This paper focuses on currency crises in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. We estimate an
Early Warning System, consisting of a dynamic factor model and an ordered logit model,
with monthly data for 1990-2007. Ex ante forecasts for 2008-2009 do not produce currency
crises in the fall of 2008, in sharp contrast with reality. Our model only predicts an
increased probability of a currency crisis for Argentina in 2009.
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1. Introduction
The 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis has affected many countries including the three
largest economies in Latin America: Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. In the fall of 2008,
Latin American currencies depreciated sharply versus the US dollar (see also Coudert,
Couharde and Mignon, 2011). In Brazil and Mexico the local currencies quickly depreciated
by more than 40%, and the Argentinian peso gradually depreciated by 20% vis-a`-vis the
US dollar (see Figure 1). The stock markets plunged with approximately 50%, and the
sovereign bond interest rate spread in Argentina quadrupled, while the spread doubled
in Mexico and Brazil. Ocampo (2009), Porzecanski (2009) and Jara, Moreno and Tovar
(2009) agree that the Global Financial Crisis has hit Latin America very hard, but that the
financial impact has been less severe. Various reasons have been provided. After a period
of economic prosperity in the 2002–2007 boom, the initial situation was much better due to
high commodity prices, increasing international trade and exceptional financing conditions.
Also reduced currency mismatches played an important role, as well as the introduction of
a more flexible exchange rate regime, improved supervision on banking sector, and more
credible monetary and fiscal policies, including high foreign reserves and low sovereign
external debt levels.
This paper investigates the experience of Latin America with currency crises since the
1990s. We address two questions. First, what were the main determinants for the currency
crises and the run-up to currency crises? Second, does the model we develop in this paper
pick up the crisis in the aftermath of the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and
more generally how did the countries perform in the run up to and the aftermath of the
2008 event?
We confine our attention to the three most important economies of Latin America:
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina that account for over 70% of regional GDP. We focus on
the period 1990 to 2009 because this period has entirely different characteristics than the
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1970s and 1980s (hyperinflation, 1980s debt crisis, political system) and because of data
availability. In this paper, we model the probability of a currency crisis in an ordered logit
model to include the severity of currency crises. We use a dynamic factor model to cope
with the large number of crisis indicators. In that respect our paper is related to Cipollini
and Kapetanios (2009), who also apply dynamic factors in their Early Warning System
(EWS).1 We estimate the ordered logit models up to and including 2007, and present
forecasts for 2008-2009.
We contribute to the EWS literature in three ways. We are the first to apply the
two stage approach in dynamic factor modeling of Doz et al. (2011) in an EWS for
currency crises, in combination with the ordered logit model such that the severity of the
currency crises is accounted for. Second, we include a wide range of variables in explaining
currency crises. This allows us to investigate the role of institutional, political, global and
commodity-related indicators, as suggested by Alvarez Plata and Schrooten (2004), and
others. Finally, we focus on Latin America, a region that is currently under investigated.
1An alternative is Innoue and Rossi (2008), who apply a diffusion index method to forecast currency
crises.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a review of financial crises
and models, early warning systems and empirical studies for Latin America in Section
2, Section 3 discusses our method. The data are presented in Section 4, followed by the
empirical results in Section 5 and the analysis of out of sample performance in Section 6.
We discuss our results in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes.
2. Review
2.1. Four generations of crises and models
Theoretical models for currency crises have been developed since the late 1970s, based
on the seminal work of Krugman (1979). The characteristics of crises have changed over
time, and so have the models. The literature distinguishes four generations of financial
crises (models).
The first generation models explain the crises as the result of fundamental inconsis-
tencies in domestic policies, which at that time (1960s and 1970s) characterize the crises.
The crises are preceded by a deterioration in the fundamentals, such as recurring budget
deficits which are monetary financed, or persistent current account deficits which exhaust
the foreign reserves.
With the crisis of the European Monetary System in 1992-1993 a second generation
crisis appears, because the weak economic fundamentals alone could not explain such a
dramatic drop in the exchange rate. If fundamentals are strong then no currency attack
will take place, and if they are weak then the government will not defend the currency.
But when the fundamentals are in a “grey zone”, multiple equilibria are possible. Relative
small changes can have a big impact. When speculators suspect that the government is not
committed to defend the exchange rate (e.g. for restoring international competitiveness),
then a massive attack follows which can trigger a self-fulfilling devaluation of the domestic
currency (Obstfeld, 1996).
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The Asian crisis of 1997–1998, a third generation crisis, gives a new boost to crisis
research. Banks and financial institutions expand and ease their loan granting policies prior
to the crisis, because they count on a government bailout in case of solvency problems.
This moral hazard behavior leads to an excessive build-up of external private debt followed
by a collapse (McKinnon and Pill, 1997). A currency devaluation can trigger a banking and
debt crisis when banks and government have a mismatch on the balance sheet: domestic
assets financed by foreign liabilities (Chang and Velasco, 1998). Krugman (2003) adds that
a combination of factors such as panics in the international investment community, policy
mistakes in handling the crisis, and poorly designed international rescue programs cause a
financial panic which results in currency crises, runs on banks, massive bankruptcies and
political turmoil.
The development of fourth generation models of financial crises is ongoing. Breuer
(2004) argues that poor institutional factors are the underlying cause for unsustainable
policies, excessive borrowing and lending, hyperinflation, etc. Although economic factors
also play a role in fourth generation models, the institutional factors set the conditions
for economic outcomes. Many databases that quantify institutional factors have become
available recently, enabling more research.
2.2. Early Warning Systems
Early Warning Systems (EWS) are models that send signals or warnings well ahead of
a potential financial crisis. The dozens of EWS that have been developed differ widely in
the definition of a financial crisis, the period of estimation, data frequency, the countries
included in the database, the inclusion of indicators, the forecast horizon, and the statistical
or econometric method (Jacobs, Kuper and Lestano, 2008). For extensive overviews see
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) or Abiad (2003). Most studies use binary methods
(logit or probit), the signals approach, Ordinary Least Squares, Markov Switching models,
binary recursive trees, contingent claims analysis, or a combination of these methods.
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The typical EWS is applied to a large number of emerging countries in order to obtain
sufficient crisis observations. This approach has received criticism. To quote Abiad (2003):
“The one-size-fits-all, panel data approach used in estimating most Early Warning Systems
(EWS) might be one of the causes of their only moderate success”. Kaminsky (2006) con-
firms this and Beckmann, Menkhoff and Sawischlewski (2006) also suggest that differences
between geographical regions justify a regional approach. A growing number of studies
focuses on a geographic region—particularly South East Asia, Central Europe and Latin
America. Even within a region distinctions can be made. Van den Berg, Candelon and
Urbain (2008) construct country clusters for six Latin American countries. In their study
for the period 1985-2004, Argentina, Brazil and Peru are grouped in one cluster because of
similar inflation patterns, while Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela are grouped in the other
cluster, due to important privatizations in the early 1990s.
2.3. Empirical studies for Latin America
With its rich history of financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009), Latin American
countries—particularly Argentina, Brazil and Mexico—have been included in EWS’s ap-
plied to emerging economies from all over the world.
There are also studies with an exclusive focus on the region. Kamin and Babson (1999)
construct an EWS to predict currency crises for a pooled dataset of six Latin American
countries for the period 1981–1998. They use a binomial probit model to identify the
deeper causes of Latin America’s volatility. They find that domestic policy and economic
imbalances (large fiscal deficits, excessive money creation, overvalued exchange rate) are
more related with currency crises than exogenous external shocks (increase in international
real interest rates, recession in developed countries, decrease in commodity prices). Herrera
and Garcia (1999) construct the simplest possible EWS which can be updated every month
at a low cost. For this reason they select the lowest number of variables in their model: real
effective exchange rate, domestic credit growth in real terms, ratio of M2 to international
5
reserves, inflation and stock market index in real terms. They use the signals approach from
Kaminsky et al. (1998), but with one difference: they first aggregate the indicators into
a composite index and then generate signals depending on the behavior of this composite
index. They apply their model to eight Latin American countries. They acknowledge that
including external interest rates, commodity prices and the state of the real economy will
probably improve the performance, but that this will add to the complexity. To handle
this, they suggest the use of factor models to be estimated with the Kalman filter technique,
or regime switching methods.
Argentina’s long history of currency and other financial crises is analyzed in various
studies. Kaminsky, Mati and Choueiri (2009) use a VAR model to quantify the role of
domestic and external shocks in currency crises. They analyze Argentina’s currency crises
from 1970 to 2001 and find that the crises have different causes. In some crises the domes-
tic fundamentals matter, in particular inconsistent monetary and exchange rate policies.
Typically these policies are accompanied by hyperinflation, confiscations of bank deposits,
and price and wage controls, which cause uncertainty and risk aversion of households and
foreign investors. In other crises the monetary tightening in industrial countries is the key:
the resulting capital flow reversals lead to currency crises. Contagion also plays a role in
some crises in the 1990s. Cerro and Iajya (2009) analyze Argentina’s crises from 1862 to
2004. They use different techniques and a set of institutional and macroeconomic variables.
They find that institutions and their volatility are key indicators for currency crises. Al-
varez Plata and Schrooten (2004) apply the signal approach from Kaminsky et al. (1998)
and find that the Argentinian currency crisis from 2002 could not have been foreseen by
the leading indicators. They suggest that in future research institutional indicators such
as political turbulence and corruption should be included.
Another crisis that has been researched widely is the Mexico 1994/1995 “tequila” crisis.
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) focus on contagion. They identify fundamentals that
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explain why some countries are hit and others not: high real exchange rate, lending boom
and low reserves. Beziz and Petit (1997) study the use of real time data on predicting the
crisis. They find that the 1994 crisis could well have been foreseen with information avail-
able before the crisis. They use the composite leading indicator which was constructed by
the OECD in 1996 and consist of financial series (total industrial production in USA, total
imports from USA, share prices, real effective exchange rate and CPP), business surveys
(production and employment tendencies) and employment in manufacturing.
Summarizing, our work builds upon previous empirical research on Latin America. In
line with a suggestion of Herrera and Garcia (1999) we use factor models and the Kalman
filter. Our choice to to include a wide range of variables instead of preselecting explanatory
variables is inspired by Kaminsky, Mati and Choueiri (2009) who find that no category
dominates. We follow Cerro and Iajya (2009) and Alvarez Plata and Schrooten (2004) by
including institutions as explanatory variables in our model.
3. Method
We first apply dynamic factor models to extract the factors from a set of indicators, use
the estimated factors as regressors in the ordered logit model, with a crisis dating dummy
as dependent variable, and then compute ex ante forecasts. Before we turn to these models,
we first discuss the crisis dating dummy.
3.1. Crisis dating
Identifying and dating currency crises has been debated since the mid 1990s. Two ap-
proaches can be distinguished: the successful attack approach and the speculative pressure
approach. In this study, we opt for the speculative pressure approach, inspired by Girton
and Roper (1977), and later used by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) for currency
crisis purposes.
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We follow the Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) of Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) and Kaminsky (2006) defined as the weighted average of exchange rate changes
and reserve changes, with weights such that the two components of the index have equal
conditional volatilities. To determine the crises we deviate from Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999), who identify a crisis when the observation exceeds the mean by more than three
standard deviations. We use this definition to identify “very deep” crises. Similar to Cerro
and Iajya (2009) we extend the definition of crises by introducing “deep” crises (which
we define as two adjacent months with exceedance between 2 and 3 times the standard
deviation) and “mild” crises (which we define as two adjacent months with exceedance
between 1 and 2 times the standard deviation). The ordinal variable that indicates crises
periods is constructed as follows: the value 0 indicates no crisis periods, the value 1 is
assigned to mild crises, 2 to deep crises and 3 to very deep crises. As is common in early
warning systems of currency crisis, we will use the same dummy variable for the crisis
entry month and the run-up to the crisis. In this paper we choose a period of six months
preceding the onset of a crisis. In case a crisis follows within six months after a previous
crisis, then the second crisis is considered a continuation of the earlier one. If types of
crises overlap we assign the highest ordinal number to that crisis.
3.2. Dynamic factor models
Dynamic factor models exploit the idea that movements in a large number of variables
are driven by a limited number of common factors, which may enter with leads and lags
Xt = A0ft +A1ft−1 + . . .+Apft−p + t, (1)
where Xt is a N×1 vector of observations of explanatory variables in period t, ft is a r×1
vector of common components or factors, and t is a vector of idiosyncratic components,
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t ∼ NN(0,Φ). The variables are typically stationary, demeaned and standardized. For a
review of dynamic factor models we refer to e.g. Stock and Watson (2011).
Dynamic factor models can take several forms. Stock and Watson (1998) allow for
time-varying loadings, but do not allow for autoregressive dynamics in the idiosyncratic
components. Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2005) adopt a different form, which is
christened a static factor representation of the DFM by Stock and Watson (2005)
Xt = AFt + t, (2)
where A ≡ [A0 A1 . . .Ap] and Ft ≡ [f ′t . . .f ′t−p]′. Hence, a dynamic factor model with r
common factors can be written as a static factor model with (p+ 1)r static factors.
The dynamics of the r common factors is represented by a vector autoregressive VAR(m)
process of order m
Ft = Γ (L)Ft + νt, (3)
where Γ (L)Ft ≡ Γ1Ft−1 + . . .+ ΓmFt−m and νt ∼ N(0,Σν).
The factors can be estimated in the frequency domain (Forni et al., 2000, 2002), by
principal components (Bai and Ng, 2002; Stock and Watson, 2002a, 2002b), or by principal
components in combination with the Kalman filter (Forni et al. 2009; Doz, Giannone and
Reichlin, 2011). In this paper we employ the two-step approach of Doz et al. (2011), which
is based on a slightly different version of the static factor representation of the dynamic
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factor model in combination with a VAR(p) for the r common factors in the state equation:
Xt =
(
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In the first step preliminary estimates of the factors and estimates of the parameters of
the dynamic factor models are computed by principal components. In the second step the
factors are updated via the Kalman filter.2
Determination of the number of factors
One of the issues in factor analysis is the determination of the optimal number of
factors. Various procedures have been proposed, e.g. the Bayesian Information Criterium,
the Kaiser Criterium and Cattell’s scree test. The number of factors is better overestimated
than underestimated, because in the first case the factors are still estimated consistently
(Breitung and Eickmeier, 2006).
With the large dimensional factor models of recent years many studies have proposed
solutions and consistent estimators for the number of factors using different factor models
2The Kalman filter is a forward recursion procedure with uses all information up to and including
period t to compute the value of the state at period t. We do not use the Kalman smoother (which uses
all information in the sample) because if we extend the database in our out-of-sample forecast exercise in
section 6 the smoother would change the past values of the factors.
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and distributional assumptions. Here we employ the criterion of Otter, Jacobs and den
Reijer (2011; henceforth OJdR), which is associated with Onatski’s (2009) test statistic,
and related to the scree test.
Interpreting the factors
Using factor models comes at a cost. Determining the economic relevance of factors
and interpreting the factors in a meaningful way is problematic. Most indicators feature in
more than one factor, so focusing on a single factor only partially explains the full impact
of an indicator on the probability of a crisis, and may even lead to counterintuitive results.
Here we look at correlations between dynamic factors and the indicators (following e.g.
Breitung and Eickmeier, 2006).3
3.3. Ordered logit model
As our dependent variable can only take four values (yt = 0: no crisis; yt = 1: mild
crisis; yt = 2: deep crisis, and yt = 3: very deep crisis), we employ an ordered choice model,
which extends the binary choice model, allowing for a natural ordering in the outcomes y.
Assume that there are K + 1 possible outcomes, then
yt =

0 if y∗t ≤ µ1,
1 if µ1 < y
∗
t ≤ µ2,








3An alternative is to place the set of variables in well-defined groups, and apply factor analysis to each
of the groups.
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where yt is the observed ordinal variable, and y
∗
t is the continuous latent variable that is
equal to
y∗t = Zt = α +Xtβ. (7)
The thresholds µi which separate the various outcomes are estimated simultaneously with
the parameters α and β.
We use the ordered logit model, because the logistic distribution (logit model) has wider
tails than the normal distribution (probit model). This is preferable if an event has a very
low frequency, as is the case with financial crises (Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig
2003). The probabilities for each of the outcomes are:











P (yt = K) = 1− 1
1 + e−(Zt−µK)
.
For each country we will estimate two versions of the ordered logit model. The first uses
dynamics factors calculated from the data set, excluding institutional variables, because
the low variation of some discrete variables (particularly institutional variables) may cause
quasi complete separation (Zorn, 2005). This occurs when there is limited overlap in the
values of (a set of) explanatory variables and the outcomes of the dependent variable,
and causes large estimates and standard errors. The second model adds (a subset of)
institutional and political variables to the dynamic factors as separate regressors, and may
also include a contagion dummy. These models are estimated using data until and including
2007, and used to forecast the period 2008–2009.
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3.4. Ex ante forecasts
We test the out-of-sample performance of the estimated model for the period 2008M1–
2009M12. We forecast the probabilities of a mild, deep and very deep crisis with our ordered
logit model. We use realized monthly data for the indicators for the years 2008 and 2009,
and extrapolate the dynamic factors using the Kalman filter without re-estimating the
loadings of the dynamic factor model.
4. Data
Our sample starts in the early 1990s, when the effects of spillovers of the 1980s Latin
American debt crisis had faded out. The analysis for Argentina starts after the introduction
of the Convertibility Plan (April 1991) and for Brazil after the introduction of the Real
Plan (July 1994), which both can be regarded as a structural break with the hyperinflation
periods. Mexico did not experience any period of hyperinflation in the 1990s.
As explained above, we distinguish mild, deep and very deep crises. Figures 2, 3 and 4
show that very deep crises are rare; each of the countries under investigation experienced
only a few very deep crises: Mexico (December 1994 and October 2008), Brazil (January
1999) and Argentina (January 2002). We split the sample in two periods: the period until
and including December 2007 is used to estimate the models, and the period January 2008
until and including December 2009 is used to forecast currency crises. We estimate the
EMPI based on the period up to December 2007, and extend this to December 2009 using
the same weights (standard deviations).
For the explanatory variables we select apart from the “usual suspects”—the common
macroeconomic and financial variables—we include institutional variables, commodity-
related and global indicators. There are however some data limitations. Not all time
series are sufficiently long which limits the selection of explanatory variables. The quality
of some of Argentinas national statistics after 2007 is doubtful (The Economist, 2012).
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The selected indicators can be classified into separate categories:
• 13 external economic indicators, among which the deviation from real exchange rate
trend, exchange rate volatility, growth of exports, imports and foreign reserves, im-
port cover, ratio of M2 to foreign reserves.
• 19 domestic economic indicators, among which domestic real interest rate, inflation,
M2 multiplier, industrial production, share market index return.
• 14 institutional indicators, among which Herfindahl indices, political stability, cor-
ruption, investment profile, internal conflict, election years.
• 10 debt indicators, among which total debt, short term debt, debt service, arrears.
• 14 banking sector indicators (25 for Argentina), among which credit to public sector,
to private sector, ROE, deposits.
• 5 global and regional indicators, among which world economic growth, US yield,
contagion dummy.
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• 12 commodity related indicators, among which prices of oil, metals, agricultural
products, exports and imports of fuel, agricultural products, food and metals as
percentage of GDP.
The main sources for the data are the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database
of the IMF, the World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank, International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database of the Political Risk Services Group, and Beck,
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2009).4
The series have been tested for non-stationarity (using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests)
and visually inspected for seasonal effects. Where necessary a transformation is made to
render them stationary. To deal with mixed frequencies in series, we apply simple quadratic
interpolations. All series are normalized, i.e. demeaned and divided by its sample standard
deviation.
5. Empirical results
We estimate the ordered logit model for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for the period up
to and including 2007. In this section we discuss both the dynamic factor model outcomes,
and the estimation results for the ordered logit models. We do not include institutional
variables in the model, because these cause quasi complete separation due to their low
variation. We introduce a second model in which a subset of the institutional variables are
added to the dynamic factors in the ordered logit model. The extended model allows us to
test whether the institutional variables contain additional information that is significant
for currency crisis periods.
4For a complete overview, including definitions, transformations, and sources we refer to Appendix A.
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Table 1: Indicators with highest correlation with the dynamic factors (DF), with correlation coefficients
between brackets.
DF Argentina Brazil Mexico
1 Banks: change in claims
on private sector (0.889)





2 Arrears to total debt
(0.874)
Long term private debt /
total debt (-0.774)
Inflation (CPI) (0.963)
3 Change in US short term
interest rate (0.728)




4 Ratio of debt service to
reserves (0.814)
Change in deposit money
bank assets (% of GDP)
(-0.733)
US short term interest
rate (-0.630)





value added (% of GDP)
(0.716)
Change in US real GDP
growth (0.616)
6 Change in import
coverage (-0.554)
Change in long term
public and publicly
guaranteed debt / total
debt (0.639)
Change in long term
private debt / total debt
(0.632)





8 Change in oil prices
(-0.531)
Change in central bank
assets as % of GDP
(0.662)
9 Change in international
reserves to total external
debt (-0.464)
10 Change in long term
public and publicly




The OJdR criterion suggests 10 factors for Argentina. When focusing on the variables
with the largest correlation (either positive or negative) we can label each factor (see
Table 1). Factors 1 and 5 are dominated by bank indicators, while factors 2, 4, 7, 9, and
10 are labeled as debt factors. We label factor 3 as a global factor, and factor 6 as an
external economic factor. Finally, factor 8 is driven by commodities.5
Estimation results
The dynamic factor combination which yields the best fit in the ordered logit model has
4 dynamic factors and 2 lags. Column (1) in Table 2 shows that all factors, except 9 and
10, are significant at a 5% significant level. Factors 2, 3, 6 and 8 increase the probability
of a crisis.
Including institutional variables
To identify the importance of the institutional indicators we add a selection of the
institutional variables to the factors. The results are reported in column (2) in Table 2.
The institutional variables that add most information while not causing quasi complete
separation are changes in law and order, investment profile and whether there is an election
year or not. An additional contagion variable is also included. This variable is a dummy
that has a value 1 if there is a deep or very deep currency crisis in Brazil or Mexico, and
0 elsewhere. The fit is illustrated for the period 1991M5 to 2007M12 in Figure 5.
The Wald test (F -value is 0.439; the p-value equals 0.780) shows that the institutional
variables do not contribute to explaining currency crises in Argentina. So, we conclude
that institutional indicators do not play an important role in the model for Argentina.
5If we consider the five indicators with the highest correlations instead of the single indicator with the
higest correlation, then factors 2, 7, and 8 are not dominated by a single category, and commodities also
play a role in factors 1 and 10.
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Table 2: Ordered logit estimation results for Argentina, with standard errors in brackets
(1) (2)
Factors only Institutional variables included
DF1 −0.737 *** −0.955 ***
(0.366) (0.370)
DF2 −0.466 *** −0.572 ***
(0.156) (0.217)
DF3 0.972 *** 1.111 ***
(0.365) (0.405)
DF4 0.697 *** 0.704 ***
(0.205) (0.211)
DF5 −1.387 *** −0.975 **
(0.343) (0.451)
DF6 1.439 *** 1.458 ***
(0.392) (0.406)
DF7 −1.412 *** −1.133 ***
(0.401) (0.411)
















D LAWORD changes in law and order
D INVPROF changes in investment profile
ELECLEGYR election year dummy
CONTAG contagion dummy (crisis in Brazil or Mexico)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level,
* significant at 10% level
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Figure 5: Actual and fitted data, and the residuals from the ordered logit model for Argentina for the













91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Residual Actual Fitted
5.2. Brazil
The OJdR criterion suggests 8 factors for Brazil. When focusing on the variables with
the largest correlation (either positive or negative) we label factors 1, 2, 3 and 6 as debt-
related factors (see Table 1). Factors 4 and 8 are interpreted as bank factors, and factors
5 and 7 are driven by commodities.6
Estimation results
The combination of 4 dynamic factors and 2 lags yields the best fit in the ordered
logit model for Brazil. Column (1) in Table 3 shows that all factors, except 4 and 7, are
significant at a 5% significant level. Except for factor 2 all factors increase the probability
of a crisis.
6If we consider the five indicators with the highest correlations instead of the single indicator with the
higest correlation, then factors 2, 3 and 6 become combined factors consisting of debt and to a lesser extent
external economy variables.
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Table 3: Ordered logit estimation results for Brazil, with standard errors in brackets
(1) (2)
Factors only Institutional variables included
DF1 0.178 *** 0.226 **
(0.065) (0.113)
DF2 −0.181 *** −0.239 ***
(0.066) (0.082)




DF5 0.549 *** 0.332 **
(0.135) (0.157)














D GOVSTAB changes in government stability
D CORRUPT changes in corruption
ELECLEGYR election year dummy
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level,
* significant at 10% level
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Including institutional variables
To identify the importance of the institutional indicators we add a selection of the
institutional variables to the factors. The results are reported in column (2) in Table 3.
The institutional variables that add most information while not causing quasi complete
separation are changes in government stability and corruption and whether there is an
election year or not. The pseudo R2 improves and the fit is illustrated for the period
1994M8 to 2007M12 in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Actual and fitted data, and the residuals from the ordered logit model for Brazil for the period
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We conclude that institutional and political indicators do play an important role in the
model. Not only does the fit improve, the Wald test (F -value is 4.108, and the p-value
equals 0.008) shows that the included institutional variables contribute to explaining the
currency crisis in Brazil.
5.3. Mexico
According to the OJdR criterion the number of factors for Mexico is 6. Based on the
variables with the largest correlation (either positive or negative) we label factor 1 as an
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external economic factor (see Table 1). Factors 2 and 3 and related to domestic economic
indicators. Factors 4 and 5 are interpreted as global factors, and factor 6 is dominated by
debt indicators.7
Estimation results
The combination of 3 dynamic factors and 3 lags yields the best fit in the ordered
logit model for Mexico. Column (1) in Table 4 presents the estimation results for the
period 1990M1 to 2007M12. Table 4 shows that factors 2, 3 and 5 are significant at a 5%
significant level. Factor 1 is significant at a 10% significance level. All factors increase the
probability of a crisis.
Including institutional variables
Including institutional indicators improves the pseudo R2 (see column (2) in Table 4)
and the fit is illustrated for the period 1990M1 to 2007M12 in Figure 7. The institu-
tional variables that add most information while not causing quasi complete separation
are changes in bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability and investment profile. A
contagion variable is included that has a value 1 if there is a deep or very deep currency
crisis in Argentina or Brazil.
The institutional indicators do play an important role in the model; the Wald test (F -
value is 5.291, and the p-value is smaller than 0.001) shows that the included institutional
variables contribute to explaining the currency crisis in Mexico.
7If we consider the five indicators with the highest correlations instead of the single indicator with the
higest correlation, then factors 2 and 3 are related to both domestic economic and debt indicators, and
factors 4 and 5 are mixed factors, with a strong correlation with global indicators.
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Table 4: Ordered logit estimation results for Mexico, with standard errors in brackets
(1) (2)
Factors only Institutional variables included
DF1 0.221 * 0.266
(0.122) (0.289)
DF2 0.556 *** 0.816 **
(0.164) (0.396)


















CONTAG contagion dummy (crisis in Argentina or Brazil)
D BURQUAL changes in bureaucratic quality
D DEMACC changes in democratic accountability
D INVPROF changes in investment profile
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level,
* significant at 10% level
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Figure 7: Actual and fitted data, and the residuals from the ordered logit model for Mexico for the period
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6. Out-of-sample performance
In this section we investigate the out-of-sample performance of the estimated model for
the period 2008M1–2009M12.
Argentina
Figures 8 and 9 show crises forecasts for Argentina for the model with only dynamic
factors and the model including institutional variables. Since the institutional variables
are not significant the differences in the graphs are small. Our model does not forecast
the mild currency crisis that occurred in 2008, but both models predict an increase in the
probability of a mild and deep currency crisis towards the end of 2009.
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For Brazil the model without institutional variables shows an increase in the probability
of a deep currency crisis starting already at the end of the year 2008 (see Figure 10). The
model including institutional variables does not predict any crisis at all (see Figure11),
which is in contrast with Brazil’s currency crisis.


























Figure 12 is based on the model with dynamic factors only, while Figure 13 is based
on the model including institutional variables. The graphs are almost identical, and our
EWS does not predict a currency crisis in Mexico. Nevertheless, Mexico experienced a
deep currency crisis in October 2008.


























In the run-up to the crisis, the three Latin American countries experienced a period
of economic prosperity in the 2002-2007 boom, high foreign reserves, low sovereign ex-
ternal debt levels, low fiscal deficit (or even surplus), and a more flexible exchange rate
regime. Brazil faced a strongly appreciated currency before the onset of the crisis and
had an unprecedented high level of foreign reserves (Ocampo, 2009). Mexico depended
strongly on the US economy and had a highly regulated financial sector. The peso appre-
ciated in the summer of 2008. For Argentina key economic conditions were less favorable,
in particular the high and persistent inflation, which reflected important macroeconomic
imbalances (Rojas Suarez, 2011). In addition, the central government debt was higher
than in the other two countries (Ocampo, 2009), as well as the ratio of short term external
debt to international reserves (Rojas Suarez, 2011). Political risk increased because of
its macroeconomic and debt-servicing policies (Porzecansky, 2009), the anti-globalization
policies that it shared with Ecuador and Venezuela (Rojas Suarez, 2011), and through
government’s decisions such as the nationalization of its private pension regime in the late
2008.
In the fall of 2008 all three countries experience a currency crisis. The Mexican peso
depreciates strong and fast. The Brazilian real depreciates in a similar magnitude as the
Mexican peso, but over a longer time span. The Argentinian peso depreciates less than
the other two currencies. According to our crisis classification the crises in Argentina and
Brazil are mild, but in Mexico the crisis is very deep. Our EWS does not predict a crisis
for any of the countries in 2008.
The picture is different for 2009. In Brazil and Mexico the exchange rates appreciate
in 2009—in Brazil the exchange rate falls even below the pre-crisis level—what makes
this crisis more special compared to previous currency crises. Argentina’s peso does not
appreciate.
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All three countries were hit by an unusually heavy drop in export earnings between the
fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. Brazil was hit by a second exogenous
shock: heavy reversals in capital flows in the fourth quarter of 2008. Surprisingly, Brazil
did not experience a major financial crisis—or even a worse-than-average deceleration in
economic growth (Porzecanski, 2009). During the crisis Brazil implemented both counter-
cyclical fiscal and monetary policies (Rojas Suarez, 2011). In our EWS the probability
of a currency crisis in Brazil in 2009 becomes much lower when institutional variables are
included. This indicates that the structural reforms that Brazil has adopted since the 1999
financial crisis seem to have worked. Mexico experienced a deep economic contraction in
2009, heavily affecting its fiscal revenues. Mexico responded by pro-cyclical fiscal policy
and counter-cyclical monetary policy (Rojas Suarez, 2011).
In 2009 economic conditions prevented Argentina to undertake counter-cyclical mone-
tary policy, but it implemented counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Rating agencies downgraded
Argentinian government bonds and the spread surged, even to higher values than during
the 2002 crisis. The institutional environment did not help to deal with the crisis. The elec-
tions scheduled for October 2009 were held already in June 2009 in order to deal with the
GFC. However, the outcomes of the elections made things worse for the ruling president’s
party who lost its majority in parliament.
8. Conclusion
The fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 affected many countries and regions
including Latin America. In Brazil and Mexico the exchange rates depreciated by more
than 40%, the Argentinian peso depreciated 20% and financial markets (stocks, bonds)
were hit hard. This paper investigates the experience of Latin America with currency
crises since the 1990s.
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We first determine which indicators are related to past currency crises, including the
run-up to the crises. For that reason we develop an Early Warning System for currency
crises. We develop an EWS consisting of an ordered logit model, using dynamic factor
models to reduce the dimension of the information set. We find that currency crises are
driven by a limited number of indicator categories. Argentina’s crises are correlated with
debt, banking, external economy, global and commodity-related indicators, while Brazil’s
crises are related to debt, institutional and commodity-related indicators. Mexico’s crises
are related to domestic economy, institutional and global indicators.
Secondly, we use our EWS to forecast the probability of currency crises in 2008 and
2009, which is the period in which the GFC hit the region the hardest. Our model does
not predict the crisis in Mexico, it predicts a crisis for Brazil but only when institutional
and political variables are excluded, and it predicts a crisis for Argentina, more than one
year late. Since all countries experienced a currency crisis in 2008, we conclude that our
model does not pick up the impact of the GFC. The GFC episode has different features
compared to earlier currency crisis episodes, which leads us to conclude that this time was
different (after Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)).
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Appendix A. Data
Indicator Code Definition and source Transformation Data freq Countries
Economic indicators: external sector
1 Real Exchange Rate 
(RER): deviation 
from trend
RER_DEV RER = e (Pf / P), with:                                                                                       
e = nominal exchange rate Local Currency Unit per US 
dollar (IFS: AE.ZF)                                                                    
P = domestic price level: Consumer Price Index (IFS: 
64..ZF)                                                                                                                 
Pf = foreign price level: Consumer Price Inflation in 
USA (IFS 111.64..ZF)  
deviation from 5 
year moving 
average
Monthly A, B, M
2 Exchange rate 
volatility
ERVOL Monthly volatility of the nominal exchange rate (IFS: 




Monthly A, B, M
3 Export growth D_EXP Exports F.O.B.; in USD (IFS: 70.D..ZF) 12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
4 Import growth D_IMP Imports F.O.B.; in USD (IFS: 71.VD..ZF)                                    12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
5 Terms of Trade TOT ToT = exports prices / imports prices                                                                
Two ways to define this:                                                                                 
(i) Export price index (= IFS-76) / import price index (= 
IFS-76X) -Mex;                                                                               
(ii) Unit value of exports: IFS-74D ; Unit value of 
imports: IFS-75D - Arg & Bra
None (ratio) Arg & Bra (series 
74, 75): quarterly,                                      
Mex (series 76): 
monthly
A, B, M
6 Ratio of Current 
Account to GDP
CA_GDP Current account, in USD: IFS-78AL (78ALDZF…) = 
balance on goods, services and income plus current 
transfers.                                                                                                              
GDP, in nominal USD: IFS 99, converted in USD by 
average nominal exchange rate (IFS: ..RF.ZF... for Arg 
& Bra, ..WF.ZF... for Mexico). 
None (ratio) Quarterly A, B, M
7 Net Portfolio 
Investment / GDP
NETPI_GDP Portfolio assets (IFS: 78BFDZF...) - portfolio liabilities 
(IFS: 78BGDZF...). Both in USD.                         GDP in 
USD: see CA_GDP
None (ratio) Quarterly A, B, M
8 Ratio FDI to GDP NETFDI_GDP FDI outflow = IFS series 78BDDZF… and FDI inflow = 
IFS series 78BEDZF… (both in USD).                                                                      
Arg and Bra: net FDI; Mex: FDI inflow                                      
GDP in USD: see CA_GDP
None (ratio) Quarterly A, B, M
9 Ratio of Financial 
Account to GDP
FA_GDP Financial account = balance of all accounts: from trade 
to FDI and portfolio investments.                                                                                                                                    
Financial Account = IFS: 78BJDZF…                                                                 
GDP in USD: see CA_GDP.
None (ratio) Quarterly B, M
10 Trade openness D_TRD_OPEN Trade openness = sum of absolute value of exports 
and imports, divided by nominal GDP in USD.                                                                                                                                                                                                          
IFS: 78AADZF… + 78ADDZF… (= exports of goods and 
services) and 78ABDZF… + 78AEDZF… (= imports of 
goods and services)                                                                                  




Quarterly A, B, M
11 Growth of forex 
reserves





Monthly A, B, M
12 Ratio of M2 to forex 
reserves
M2RES M2: IFS series  59MB.ZF… (Arg > 2000; Bra & Mex), 
Central Bank Rep.Argentina (< 2000, Arg).                                                                                                                
Converted into USD with end-of-period nominal 
exchange rate: IFS series ..AE.ZF...; Foreign Exchange 
Reserves: IFS series .1L.DZF…
None (ratio) Monthly A, B, M
13 Import cover D_IMPCOV Forex Reserves excl.gold from IFS, in USD (.1L.DZF…) 




Monthly A, B, M
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Economic indicators: domestic real and public sector 
1 real GDP growth D_RGDP GDP in nominal LCU. IFS: 99B..ZF...                            
(Arg > 1995; Bra & Mex), INDEC (Arg < 1995).                               




Quarterly A, B, M
2 GDP per capita D_RGDPCAP GDP divided by total population;                                                       
GDP: see D_RGDP;                                                                        




Annual A, B, M













GOVCONS_GDP Gov.Cons. (in LCU): IFS 91F..ZF…                                                                          
GDP (in LCU): IFS 99B





HHCONS_GDP Household cons: IFS series 96F..ZF…                            
GDP (in LCU): IFS 99B
None (ratio) Arg < 1993: 
annual, > 1993 
quarterly;                    
Bra & Mex: 
quarterly
A, B, M
6 Ratio of 
government 
revenues to GDP
D_GOVREV Gov't revenues: integrate two incomplete series 
(IFS: c1...BA… and a1...CG…).                                                                                              





7 Ratio of 
government 
expenses to GDP
D_GOVEXP Gov't expenses: integrate two incomplete series 
(IFS: c2...BA… and a2...CG…).                                                                                              





8 fiscal balance to 
GDP  
GOVBAL_GDP Budget = difference between revenues (IFS: 
c1...BA… and a1...CG…) and expenses (IFS: c2...BA… 
and a2...CG…)                                                                                                              
GDP (in LCU): IFS 99B
None (ratio) Quarterly B, M
9 Change in 
inventories to GDP
INVCHG_GDP Change in inventories (in LCU) IFS 93I.CZF...                                     
GDP (in LCU): 99B.RWF… 
None (ratio) Quarterly M
10 Inflation (CPI) INFLAT Consumer Price Inflation (IFS: 64..ZF) 12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
11 Growth of 
industrial 
production
D_INDPROD Industrial production index: Bra & Mex: IFS-66.                                                                                  




Monthly A, B, M
12 Domestic Savings GDSAV_GDP Ratio of savings to GDP: WDI-code: NY.GDS.TOTL.ZS   None (ratio) Annual A, B, M
13 Gross capital 
formation
GFCAP_GDP Arg & Mex: 93E.CZF... and 99B.RWF… (quarterly)                                                                                                                   




Arg & Mex: 
quarterly,                    
Bra: annual
A, B, M
14 Domestic real 
interest rate
REALINT 6 month time deposit rate deflated by CPI: 
(1+Rnominal) / (1+Inflation) - 1  , with:                             
6 months time deposit rate (IFS: 60L..ZF)                                                                    
CPI (IFS: 64..ZF)
See formula Monthly A, B, M
15 M2 growth              
(real LCU)
D_M2 M2: see M2RES 12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
16 M2 money 
multiplier
M2MULT Ratio of M2 to monetary base.                                                       
M2: see M2RES                                                                
Base money: IFS: 19MA.ZF…
ratio Monthly A, B, M
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17 Sovereign Bond 
Interest Rate 
Spreads, basis 
points over US 
Treasuries
INTSPREAD GEM: difference between local government interest 
rate on bonds in USD and US government on bonds 
in USD.
None (spread) Monthly B





EMBI_RET GEM: index that measures the value of the bonds. Monthly return Monthly B
19 Return on the 
major stock index
STOCKRET Major stock index from each country (IPC for 
Mexico, Merval for Argentina and BOVESPA for 
Brazil). In own currency. Source: Economatica.
Monthly return Monthly A, B, M
Debt indicators
1 Ratio total debt to 
GDP
DEBT_GDP WDI code for total -external- debt (in USD): 
DT.DOD.DECT.CD                                                                      
GDP (in USD): see CA_GDP
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
2 Short term debt / 
total debt
STD_DEBT Short term debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DSTC.CD                                                                                           
Total debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DECT.CD
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
3 Use of IMF credit 
to GDP
IMF_GDP IMF credit: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DIMF.CD                                                   
GDP (in USD): see CA_GDP
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
4  Arrears to total 
debt
ARR_TDEBT WDI code for interest arrears (USD): 
DT.IXA.DPPG.CD                                                                     
WDI code for principal arrears (USD): 
DT.AXA.DPPG.CD                                                               
WDI code for total external debt (USD): 
DT.DOD.DECT.CD
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
5 Debt reduction / 
total debt
REDU_TDEBT Debt reduction: (WDI code) DT.DFR.DPPG.CD                                                                                           
Total debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DECT.CD
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
6 Long term private 
non guaranteed 
debt / total debt
LTDPNG_TDEBT LT PNG debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.PRVS.CD                                                                                           




Annual A, B , M
7 Long term public 
and publicly 
guaranteed debt / 
total debt
LTDPPG_TDEBT LT PPG debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.PUBS.CD                                                                                           




Annual A, B , M
8 International 
reserves to total 
external debt
D_RES_DEBT Total debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DECT.CD                                      




Annual A, B , M
9 Ratio of debt 
service to exports
DSERV_EXP WDI code for debt service (current USD): 
DT.TDS.DECT.CD  IFS code for exports (millions  of 
current USD): 70..DZF...
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
10 Ratio of debt 
service to reserves
DSERV_RES Debt service (WDI code): DT.TDS.DECT.CD                                       
Reserves (IFS code): .1L.DZF…
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
Bank sector indicators
1 Ratio of domestic 
credit to the public 
sector to GDP
DCREDPUB Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of 
GDP) (WDI code = FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS)
 minus
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
(WDI code = FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS)
None (ratio) Annual A, M
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2 Ratio of 
commercial bank 
lending to GDP
DCREDBANK Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of 
GDP). WDI code = FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS
None (ratio) Annual A, B, M
3 Liquid liabilities                           
(% of GDP)
D_LIQLIAB Code: ll_usd. Source: Financial Structure, from 




Annual A, B, M
4 Central bank 
assets                      
(% of GDP)
D_CBASSET Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the 





5 Deposit money 
bank assets                   
(% of GDP)
D_DMBANKAS Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by 





Annual A, B, M
6 Private credit by all 
financial 
institutions                    
(% of GDP)
D_PCRED_GDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other 






7 Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks                               
(% of GDP)





Annual A, B, M
8 Private credit by 
other financial 
institutions                 
(% of GDP)
D_PCRED_OTH Private credit by other financial institutions to GDP. 
Difference between private credit by all 
fin.institutions and private credit by deposit money 
banks.                                                                                





9 Financial system 
deposits                              
(% of GDP)
D_FSDEPOS Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions as a share of 





Annual A, B, M
10 Ratio Bank credit 
to bank deposits
D_BCRED_BDEP Private credit by deposit money banks as a share of 
demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money 





Annual A, B, M
11 Net interest 
margin
NETINTMG Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a 
share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets.                                                                                                    
FS/WB code: netintmargin
None Annual A, B, M
12 Bank 
concentration
BANKCONC Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of 
all commercial banks.                                                                                                
FS/WB code: concentration
None Annual A, B, M
13 Bank ROE BANKROE Average Return on Equity (Net Income/Total 
Equity). FS/WB code: roe
None Annual A, B, M
14 Bank Z-Score BANKZ Z = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E       with:                                                   
A = Working Capital/Total Assets                                                          
B = Retained Earnings/Total Assets                                                                             
C = EBIT/Total Assets                                                                                                                                           
D = Market Value of Equity/Total Liab                                                                                                                                  
E = Sales/Total Assets
None Annual B
15 Deposit money 
banks and other 
banking instit: 
assets
D_BANKASSET Sum of:                                                                                                
Deposit money banks Assets (IFS: 7A.DZF…)                                                                                                                          





16 Deposit money 




D_BANKLIAB Sum of:                                                                                                             
Deposit money banks Liabilities                                 
(IFS: 7B.DZF…)                                                                                                                                                                         






17 CB: foreign assets - 
foreign liabilities
D_CB_FA_FL Difference between:                                                               











D_CB_CGVT Difference between:                                                                     
Claims on central government                                                
(IFS: 12A..ZF…)                                                                                     






19 CB: claims on 
deposit money 
banks and other 
banking inst.
D_CB_BANKS Sum of:                                                                                         
Claims on Deposit Money Banks                                  
(IFS: 12E..ZF…)                                                                                                          






20 Bank sector: 
reserves
D_BANKRES Sum of:                                                                                               
Reserves from DMB (IFS: 20...ZF…)                                 






21 Bank sector: 
Foreign assets - 
foreign liabilities
D_BANK_FA_FL Difference between:                                                 
Foreign assets from banks                                                    
(IFS: 21...ZF… + 41...ZF…)                                                                                    
Foreign liabilities from banks                                        





22 Bank sector: claims 
on PPG 
D_BANK_PPG Claims on PPG:                                                                                               
Claims on central govt                                                
(IFS: 22A..ZF…  + 42A..ZF… )                                                                                                                     
Claims on state and local government                                                  
(IFS: 22B..ZF…  + 42B..ZF…)                                                                                                    
Claims on official entities                                                                             





23 Banks: claims on 
private sector
D_BANK_PRIV Claims from DMB and other banking instit. on 













25 Banks: time, 











1 Herfindahl Index 
Government 
HERFGOV DPI (World Bank / Beck et al. 2001): HERFGOV 
represents a measure of government coalition 
concentration, by squaring the percentage of parties 
in the government coalition. The presence of a 
majority party in the government coalition increases 
the index. Having many (small) parties in the 
government reduces it. 
None. Annual A, B, M
2 Herfindahl Index 
Opposition
HERFOPP DPI: herfopp.   Idem herfgov, but now for 
government opposition. 
None. Annual B, M
3 Political stability D_GOVSTAB On a scale from 0 to 12, with 12 the highest level of 





Annual A, B, M
4 Socioeconomic 
Conditions
D_SOCIOECO On a scale from 0 to 12, with 12 the highest level of 





Annual A, B, M
5 Investment Profile D_INVPROF On a scale from 0 to 12, with 12 the best investment 





Annual A, B, M
6 Internal Conflict D_INTCONFL On a scale from 0 to 12, with 12 the lowest level of 
internal conflict (low risk) and 0 the highest level 








D_DEMACC On a scale from 0 to 6, with 6 the highest level of 





Annual A, B, M
8 Corruption D_CORRUPT ICRG. Scale 6 (low corruption) to 0 (high corruption).    12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
9 Law and Order D_LAWORD ICRG. Scale 6 (high law and order) to 0 (low law and 




Annual A, B, M
10 Bureaucracy 
Quality
D_BURQUAL ICRG. Scale 4 (high bureaucratic quality) to 0 (low 




Annual A, B, M
11 Party orien-tation 
with resp. to econ. 
policy
GOVT_RLC Dummy indicates orientation of the executive 
power. Right (1); Left (3); Center (2); No information 
(0). DPI code: execrlc
None Annual A, B, M
12 Absolute majority 
in the houses 
GOVT_MAJ Dummy indicates if executive has absolute majority 
in the houses. 1 = yes, 0 = no. DPI code: allhouse
None Annual A, B, M
13 Degree of 
polarization 
POLARIZ Polarization is the maximum difference between the 
chief executive’s party’s value (EXECRLC) and the 
values of the three largest government parties and 
the largest opposition party. 0 = no polarization. DPI 
code: polariz
None Annual A, B, M
14 election year for 
executive power
ELECEXEYR Dummy variable with value 1 in the year of elections 
for executive power and 0 otherwise (DPI: exelec)
The calender year 
of the elections is 
assigned 1.
Annual A, B, M
15 election year for 
legislative power
ELECLEGYR Dummy variable with value 1 in the year of elections 
for legislative power and 0 otherwise (DPI: legelec)
The calender year 
of the elections is 
assigned 1.
Annual A, B, M
Global economy indicators
1  US long term 
interest rate






2 US short term 
interest rate
TBILL IFS: 11160C..ZF... None Monthly USA
3 US real GDP 
growth




4 GDP volume      % 
change
D_GDPWORLD Change (year-on-year) of the volume of the GDP 
growth. IFS series 00199BPXZF...
None Annual world
5 Contagion of crises 
in the region
CONTAG Based on EMPI calculations: dummy = 1 if there is a 
financial crisis in one of the other LA3 countries
None Monthly A, B, M
Commodity indicators
1 Agriculture, value 
added      (% of 
GDP)
D_VA_AGRI WDI code: NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS 12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M





















5 Agricultural raw 
materials exports: 
D_AGRI_EXP Agricultural raw material exports, expressed as % of 
GDP.                                                                                                                
Elaborated from the following series:                                         
Agricultural raw material exports, as % of 
merchandise exports. Source: WDI, code: 
TX.VAL.AGRI.ZS.UN                                                        
Goods exports (BoP, current US$; Source: WDI, 
code: BX.GSR.MRCH.CD)                                                              





Annual A, B, M
6 Food materials 
exports: 
D_FOOD_EXP Idem, but food materials exports. Source: WDI, 
code: TX.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
7 Fuel exports: D_FUEL_EXP Idem, but fuel exports. Source: WDI, code: 
TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
8 Ores and metals 
exports: 
D_METAL_EXP Idem but ores and metals exports. Source: WDI, 
code: TX.VAL.MMTL.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
9 Agricultural raw 
materials imports: 
D_AGRI_IMP Agricultural raw material imports, expressed as % of 
GDP.                                                                                                                        
Elaborated from the following series:                                         
Agricultural raw material imports, as % of 
merchandise imports. Source: WDI, code: 
TM.VAL.AGRI.ZS.UN                                                        
Goods imports (BoP, current US$; Source: WDI, 
code: BM.GSR.MRCH.CD)                                                              
GDP (current US$; Source: WDI, code: 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
Idem Annual A, B, M
10 Food materials 
imports: 
D_FOOD_IMP Idem, but food materials imports. Source: WDI, 
code: TM.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
11 Fuel imports: D_FUEL_IMP Idem, but fuel imports. Source: WDI, code: 
TM.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
12 Ores and metals 
imports: 
D_METAL_IMP Idem, but ores and metals imports. Source: WDI, 
code: TM.VAL.MMTL.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
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